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Kurzbeiträge / Reports 
 
Friederike Fuhlrott 
 
Burundi after the civil war:  
demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants  
 
 
fter the signing of a peace accord it is the disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration of the former fighting groups that is one of the first 
steps towards a conflict transformation process (Kingma 2000). In most 
cases, some of those who fought are, for the time being, integrated into the 
subsequently downsized national army. Those who remain, often the ma-
jority, are demobilised and reintegrated into civilian life. But how does this 
process take place on site? What are the procedures involved and what are 
the consequences of living together in the receiving communities? In this 
article, based on a PhD thesis in progress, the question of reintegrating ex-
combatants after the civil war in Burundi will be discussed. At the beginning 
of 2006, the four months of field research were structured around the fol-
lowing guiding questions: How are ex-combatants reintegrated into their 
communities in Burundi and which factors influence this reintegration? The 
article will show that up to now reintegration has gone relatively well on the 
social level, but has not yet started on the economic level. 
 
 
Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration 
 
Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) are part of the gen-
eral framework of peacebuilding. In order to classify the problem in the 
larger context of peace consolidating measures after the settlement of violent 
conflicts, it is common to view DDR from a global perspective. 
In general, DDR is a highly valued peacebuilding measure during the 
immediate post-conflict phase. After the settlement of a violent conflict, it is 
seen as an important activity to, first of all, disarm all former fighters in 
order to ensure a safe environment during the (re)establishment of official 
structures in the government, in the military, and in the police. As such, 
DDR is, as a standard practice, part of the broader concept of security sector 
reform. The part of disarmament is rather a technical issue, which is pre-
dominantly executed by peace operations in the country, typically by peace-
keeping troops in cooperation with the national government and military. 
A 
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Often, the collection of arms not only targets ex-combatants but also civil-
ians. Generally, the conditions of DDR are negotiated in advance and re-
corded in the formal peace agreement. The process of disarmament is sepa-
rated from the demobilisation and reintegration process in planning and 
execution.  
Regarding demobilisation and reintegration activities, they are non-
military and should mark the transition from being a soldier to becoming a 
civilian. Demobilisation and reintegration have an impact on and, at the 
same time, are influenced by the economic, social, and political dimension of 
peacebuilding. In addition, they have an influence on the future develop-
ment of those areas in the country or region concerned. In spite of the im-
portance of successful demobilisation and reintegration for a peaceful devel-
opment, it should be noted that the ex-combatants are usually not the largest 
group to be reintegrated after a war because returning refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons often outnumber the group of ex-combatants. This 
complicates the post-war situation because all returning groups compete for 
generally scarce resources and opportunities, getting land to cultivate, pub-
lic support from the government or international organisations, and finding 
jobs, amongst other things. The balancing act of DDR is that on the one 
hand, the support of ex-combatants must not give the impression that they 
are being rewarded for fighting, killing, and other atrocities they committed. 
On the other hand, ex-combatants should be sufficiently reintegrated both 
socially and economically, in order to avoid that they pick up arms again. 
The most pressing problems or structural circumstances that hamper 
reintegration are the fact that post-conflict countries are usually very poor 
with immature economic structures and thus there is an absence of jobs to 
absorb this new labour force (Date-Bah 2003). From the political point of 
view, the government is highly unstable and political institutions are not 
fully developed. In addition, a demilitarisation of politics has not yet taken 
place. Generally, a culture of violence prevails also on the social level. This 
entails the risk of a relapse into violence, especially when it is known from 
experience that using arms and being a fighter earns a living and being a 
civilian does not.  
From a political and economic point of view, it is one of the aims of 
DDR that the government saves money in the military budget, which it 
should then invest in the social and economic development of the country. 
However, as these programmes are very cost-intensive for the government, 
also in the long run, the so-called peace dividend is actually rather low. The 
aim of DDR in the short run is thus to provide a safe environment to stabi-
lise a fragile peace after the end of violence, and in the long run to set the 
conditions for long-term sustainable peace and development (Kingma 2000).  
The revealing question on DDR programmes is: What are the factors 
that influence reintegration in such a way that the target of living together 
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peacefully can be met? Since this aim is difficult to meet, the case of Burundi 
will provide a deeper insight into an ongoing process of demobilisation and 
reintegration. 
 
 
Background to the conflict 
 
Since independence in 1962, Burundi has gone through several periods of 
‘ethnicised’ massacres. 85% of the population is generally regarded to con-
sist of Hutu and 14% belong to the group of the Tutsi. However, the conflict 
was and is more about power than about ethnicity. The Tutsi minority had 
always been in power in Burundi, which was used and reinforced by the 
colonisers. As a result, ethnicity was politicised and violence repeatedly 
broke out along ethnic lines. In 1993, the civil war broke out after the first 
democratically elected Hutu president was assassinated. The predominantly 
Tutsi military fought against Hutu rebel groups, the largest of these groups 
is today the ruling party Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – 
Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) (Summit Oketch and Polzer 
2002, African Union 2005, Brachet and Wolpe 2005). 
Because the war was never officially declared, it is difficult to pinpoint 
its duration. In 2000 the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 
was signed and in 2002 the main rebel group, the CNDD-FDD, agreed to a 
cease-fire. In 2005 a new government was elected, with Pierre Nkurunziza 
from the CNDD-FDD as president. The last remaining rebel group, the 
Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) signed a cease-fire agreement as late as 
September 2006. The war caused approximately 300,000 deaths and it is 
estimated that about 400,000 persons were internally displaced. 250,000 
refugees went to camps in Tanzania and several thousand to Rwanda and to 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tanzania still hosts about 200,000 refu-
gees who had already fled from an early outbreak of violence in 1972. Until 
the end of 2005, the UNHCR facilitated the repatriation of over 250,000 Bu-
rundian refugees, hence, about 200,000 were still living in Tanzania in 2006 
(UNHCR 2006). According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the 
number of internally displaced persons in Burundi was about 117,000 in 
May 2005 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2006). 
 
 
Demobilisation and reintegration in Burundi 
 
As described for DDR in general, the situation of ex-combatants in Burundi 
is also related to the general socio-economic situation and to other groups in 
the country. In comparison to the figures of refugees and internally dis-
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placed persons, the officially planned number of 55,000 ex-combatants par-
ticipating in a reintegration scheme seems relatively small. Nevertheless, 
former fighters are a highly sensitive group and their successful reintegra-
tion is crucial to enduring peace in the country.  
The main body responsible at the national level for demobilisation and 
reintegration activities is the Executive Secretariat of the Commission Natio-
nale Chargée de la Démobilisation, de la Réinsertion et de la Réintégration des Ex-
Combattants (CNDRR). Parallel to the principle of national ownership of the 
CNDRR, the most important international institution is the World Bank 
(WB), which is engaged through the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reinte-
gration Programme (MDRP) of the wider Great Lakes Region (MDRP 2007). In 
Burundi the WB/MDRP, in cooperation with CNDRR, formulated the de-
mobilisation and reintegration strategy for the country, namely the National 
Programme. Basically, CNDRR is responsible for organising and managing 
the execution of this and WB/MDRP provides financing, technical assis-
tance, monitoring and controlling of the progress of the programme. As the 
CNDRR is located in the capital, provincial and local reintegration structures 
coordinate the activities in the countryside. 
 
Official strategy 
 
By implementing the articles of the Arusha agreement, the overall aim of the 
national reintegration programme (here: National Programme) is to consoli-
date peace, security, and national reconciliation in order to allow a sustain-
able economic and social development. Specific aims are to reduce the risk of 
ex-combatants’ participating in armed actions, to reintegrate them into eco-
nomic activities, and to satisfy social conditions in a context of conflict pre-
vention. Furthermore, with their reintegration a contribution to national 
development and employment creation as well as to poverty reduction 
should be made (CNDRR 2005). 
How does demobilisation and reintegration work in Burundi? If an ex-
combatant does not want to join the newly established army, the Force de 
Défense Nationale, or the police, or has been rejected by these bodies, he or 
she returns to civilian life. The official procedure, starting with demobilisa-
tion and ending in reintegration, is technically clearly prescribed. The jour-
ney begins at a demobilisation centre, where the ex-combatant removes his 
or her uniform and – ideally – his or her combatant manners and attitudes. 
All ex-combatants are registered and ID cards are distributed. Organised in 
modules, ex-combatants are informed about programme benefits, including 
implementation arrangements, about how to behave as a civilian, and about 
civic duties and rights, including also women’s rights. Another component 
of the demobilisation phase consists of HIV/AIDS prevention and mitiga-
tion measures including medical screening and voluntary counselling and 
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testing. After approximately ten days in the demobilisation centre, the certi-
fied demobilised person receives a transitional subsistence allowance 
(approx. US-$ 500) in instalments, which allows the payment of transport to 
the place where the ex-combatant wants to settle (normally his or her prov-
ince of origin) and covers the basic needs over a period of nine months. The 
reinsertion period is ideally followed directly, at the latest three months 
later, by the reintegration measures. In order to facilitate the economic rein-
tegration, the ex-combatant receives in this phase a benefit of the equivalent 
of approx. US-$ 600 in-kind. During the stay at the demobilisation centre the 
ex-combatant will have planned a project in which he or she wants to invest 
this money. The US-$ 600 are given in the form of, e.g., a cow for cattle-
breeding, flour for a bakery, or items to start a retail trade.1 These activities 
are accompanied by NGOs as executive partners on site and by the provin-
cial office concerned. 
By October 2006, 21,657 ex-combatants had been demobilised, of which 
494 were women and 3,015 children. Of the demobilised adults, 5,412 had 
been reintegrated, meaning they had received all the intended support 
(MDRP 2007). Depending on when they were officially demobilised, at least 
the first group of people were or are without support for up to four months. 
The reason why the demobilised people had or have to wait for their sup-
port seems to be at least two-fold: Firstly, the World Bank and thus the 
MDRP administration is rather complicated and as a consequence was only 
adopted with delays by the Burundian government. Secondly, the CNDRR is 
technically overtasked by the requirements of the WB/MDRP as well as by 
the requirements of the ex-combatants. In addition, the executive partners 
on site are not capable of fulfilling their tasks adequately.  
 
Who is an ex-combatant? 
 
Not everybody who participated actively in the war is, however, defined as 
being an ex-combatant. In order to gain access to the demobilisation centre, 
to become a certified demobilised person, and thus to be entitled to the rein-
sertion and reintegration payments, the former fighter has to fulfil certain 
criteria. The identification and verification of combatant status is a difficult 
process and caused a delay in launching of the programme. General criteria 
are the following:  
 
                                     
1  68 % of the Burundian population lives on less than one dollar a day (World Bank, 2006). 
Thus, although the financial and in-kind support seems to be high, this support will not 
lead to a long-term secured livelihood because of the generally very poor economic condi-
tions and perspectives of the country. 
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• Submission of a specified ratio of arms and ammunition; 
• Identification by the unit commander of his/ her force; 
• Affiliation with a recognized armed entity that engaged in military 
fighting before the signing of the respective cease-fire agreement of that 
group; 
• Passing a test of basic military knowledge and skills; and 
• Burundian nationality (World Bank, 2004: 17). 
 
This excludes, for example, not only ex-combatants who demobilised spon-
taneously before the signing of the cease-fire – i.e. deserters – but also mili-
tias. Although they fought and carried out other orders such as recruiting 
new blood or picking up dead or injured combatants from the battlefield, 
they do not have access to the benefits of the National Programme, but they 
receive a single allowance of approximately US-$ 100. About 27,367 militia 
members have been demobilised, nearly all of whom have already received 
assistance (ONUB 2006). Furthermore, apart from the militia and those who 
demobilised spontaneously – after the government then in power appealed 
for them to surrender their arms – there are other groups who claim to have 
been officially demobilised. Those are, for example, reservists and men who 
did their military service during the war. They do not have any entitlement 
and their number is not known. 
 
Influencing factors of reintegration 
 
A preliminary analysis of the obtained data and information shows that the 
main factors that influence the reintegration either divide the ex-combatants 
from the rest of the community or merge the demobilised and the popula-
tion into the receiving communities. Regarding both possibilities, the influ-
ence can be viewed from the perspective of the ex-combatants and from the 
civilian perspective. Of course, ex-combatants are now civilians too, but the 
term civilian is used here for those who did not take part in the fighting, in 
order to distinguish between ex-combatants and the rest of the non-fighting 
population. 
Generally speaking, by May 2006 the reintegration process had pro-
ceeded relatively well on the social level, but had not yet started on the eco-
nomic level. All ex-combatants interviewed had received their reinsertion 
funds, but most of them had not yet received the reintegration benefits, even 
though they had left the demobilisation centre more then a year before and 
consequently had been without any support for up to four months (official 
demobilisation started in December 2004).  
For an effective demobilisation and reintegration process it is essential 
that unifying factors are enhanced, or at least not hindered, and divisive 
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factors are avoided as much as possible. The principal aim of reintegration is 
at least two-sided: on the one hand, a peaceful co-habitation in the local 
community is targeted, and on the other hand, new recruitment by rebel 
groups should be made impossible. For this purpose, not only a positive 
social reintegration but also a positive economic reintegration is crucial. 
However, it is often not possible to separate these two dimensions from each 
other in reality. Within both dimensions of reintegration, separating and 
divisive factors can be discovered. 
 
Divisive and unifying factors 
 
In Burundi, there is much evidence on the social level that a non-targeted 
approach increases the feeling of solidarity among the community and thus 
facilitates reintegration. All such activities and attitudes have a positive 
influence that ignore and negate differences between the group of ex-com-
batants and other groups. On the economic level the reaction by the local 
community is two-sided. On the one hand, from the security point of view, 
most community members are scared in case the ex-combatants no longer 
receive financial or in-kind transfers because ‘they are used to using weap-
ons’ to get what they want by force. On the other hand, they feel unfairly 
treated because the ex-combatants receive more financial support than they 
do. In addition, they criticise the fact that the ex-combatants did not learn 
how to use their money successfully because they also spend it, sometimes 
predominantly, on alcohol and consumer goods. As the MDRP programme 
emphasises mainly personal monetary and in-kind reinsertion and reinte-
gration support, the main interest in the programme seems to lie in eco-
nomic assistance, and so the support of social, unifying, and non-targeted 
activities is neglected. Although it is problematic that the MDRP does not 
focus on these aspects, it has to be taken into account that technically it is a 
big challenge, especially to put them and economic support into practice, 
simultaneously. 
Not having access to, for example, aid distribution lists, counteracts 
both the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants. Some local au-
thorities deny access to these lists because of the assistance the ex-combat-
ants already receive; however, some of them are in need because they are 
just as poor as the others. Even so, it is not so much a question of which 
group is poorer but what the effect of a different treatment might be. It 
seems to be a mistake to judge, treat, and exclude ex-combatants as if they 
were a homogenous group, since this can create a negative counter-reaction 
from the demobilised as a group, which could discourage reintegration, and 
simplify recruitment and violent actions.  
A possible risk on the social level is the fact that many of the internally 
displaced persons, some being ex-combatants, have not yet returned home. 
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They live in camp sites and often go to their hill2 to farm, returning to the 
camp at night because they feel safer there. In addition, it was mentioned in 
the interviews with community members that those ex-combatants who do 
not return to the hills but prefer to stay in the provincial centres are mostly 
ex-army soldiers. Considering that internally displaced persons as well as 
ex-army soldiers are predominantly Tutsi, these two facts show tendencies 
of segregation, which is, however, denied in every interview. At present, this 
is not perceived to be a possible threat to reintegration or to the peace proc-
ess as a whole, but it could become a major issue in the future.  
A further threat to the peace process could be situated outside the tar-
get group of this research, namely, in the reaction of those former fighters 
who have no access to the official demobilisation programme. It is not possi-
ble to estimate the potential for unrest among this group but they, especially 
the ex-militias, have already demonstrated in the capital against being ex-
cluded from the programme. However, since they were seriously threatened 
with prison, they seem to be quiet for the moment. As already mentioned, 
not only the militias are outside the official demobilisation process, but also 
deserters, people who did their military service during the war, and reserv-
ists. The effects and the symbolic impact of choosing exclusively ‘real’ ex-
combatants remain to be analysed, especially since the excluded former 
fighters are presumably a much larger group in number. 
Facts and procedures that jeopardise the aim of reintegration are influ-
enced to the same degree on a social and economic level. But especially eco-
nomic failures are dangerous at the moment. First of all, it is very risky to 
create high expectations, as has been observed in other countries as well 
(Colletta et al. 1996). Expectations created by the National Programme in 
Burundi, and thus by the WB/MDRP and the government (including the 
former fighting parties), are the following: receiving money and in-kind 
transfers, receiving medical treatment for free, getting help from the Na-
tional Programme in every situation, reintegrating easily on the economic 
level, not being forgotten by the party they fought for, and, especially, cre-
ating a stable economic basis for the future through the reintegration benefit. 
Most of these assumptions are not met. Disappointed expectations lead to 
frustration, and people who are accustomed to use weapons could react 
violently and thus put the peace process at risk. 
It can be reasoned that the social reintegration works relatively well to 
date because the ex-combatants have been prepared to face difficulties. They 
were scared of meeting again those they had raped, stolen from, and whose 
houses they had destroyed. This, in combination with seminars they had in 
                                     
2  Because the landscape is mountainous in Burundi, hill (frz. colline) is an administrative 
entity. 
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the demobilisation centres about how to behave as a civilian – even if they 
were short and brief – contributes to a relatively good co-habitation so far. 
The reinsertion money also had a very positive effect on peaceful co-habita-
tion. Thus, it is important to keep the balance between economic support 
and not creating the impression that fighting is profitable even after the end 
of the war. On the one hand, they must not be tempted or forced to steal and 
they need a chance to generate income after having lost their primary source 
as a combatant. On the other hand, the civilian population as well as the ex-
combatants must not get the impression that they are rewarded for what 
they did. In order not to risk social unrest it is crucial to communicate clearly 
and transparently about benefits. Raising expectations that cannot be met 
must be prevented. Explicit communication is essential and in the case of 
Burundi it seems that this claim is not being met. The conditions and infor-
mation about benefits are not consistently communicated from the top of the 
National Programme down to the beneficiaries and to the community mem-
bers. There are a lot of ambiguities and rumours about who profits how, and 
why the reintegration benefits are delayed. In order to avoid frustration, it is 
crucial to show realistic future prospects of economic reintegration perspec-
tives that actually exist among those who are well-informed about reinte-
gration activities.  
Finally, some uniting effects during the ongoing reintegration process 
should be mentioned. It seems that Burundi was fortunate in the early 
beginning of the demobilisation and reintegration phase. As the ex-combat-
ants were not the only returning group, even if a very special and important 
one, no dichotomy between the community members per se and the demo-
bilised could be established. In particular the social weight of return was 
distributed among all repatriates, not solely among the ex-combatants. Fur-
thermore, the reinsertion payment was able to remove a lot of tension. As all 
sides were afraid in the beginning of how the other would behave, the rein-
sertion money had built a kind of anchor. The community members knew 
the ex-combatants would not need to steal and the ex-combatants knew the 
civilians would profit from the money if they spent it within the community. 
In the same way the knowledge about the time in the demobilisation centre 
calmed the population in the communes. They knew that the former fighters 
had learnt how to behave as civilians and how to interact with other civil-
ians. Consequently, preparation for every group in every perspective can 
definitively be pointed out as having influenced a relatively positive start of 
the reintegration process. However, its potentials do not seem to be fully 
realised because there are not enough actions in this direction.  
Furthermore, it is a unifying factor when the receiving community is 
the community of origin. The demobilised are known by the people, they 
might have family and friends there and so they are not strangers. In addi-
tion to this, it is possible to get into contact with people they had worked 
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with before the war. Thus, social and economic reintegration (in the short 
term at least) seems to be all the more possible, the more contact the ex-com-
batant had to his or her community before or during the war. What further 
influenced a mostly positive welcome home for the demobilised is the fact 
that it seems to be true that the civil population is tired of war. They are 
ready to forgive for the sake of peace. On the surface, the ex-combatants feel 
the same way, but they often declare that in case of a new war they would be 
ready to take up arms again.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The development of the general political and security situation in the coun-
try is of foremost importance for the future of reintegration. With the mid-
2006 allegations of a coup attempt, supposedly planned by members of the 
former transitional government, ensuing detentions, massive accusations of 
human rights violations committed by the security forces, the resignation 
and flight into exile of the vice president in September 2006, the sacking of 
the new vice president in February 2007, and the expulsion of the controver-
sial CNDD-FDD party chairman in February 2007, the future development 
of Burundi towards a peaceful country is far from being on a stable path. 
Moreover, Burundi remains one of the poorest nations in Africa. After the 
absence of sufficient rain during the rainy seasons in 2006, two million peo-
ple are at risk of a food crisis after devastating flooding in January and Feb-
ruary 2007. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the demobilisation and reintegration 
process in Burundi has contributed to the stabilisation of the fragile peace at 
the beginning and until today. It is particularly on the social level that living 
together peacefully can be ascertained in the time immediately after the 
return of the former fighters. It is the task of all people and official organisa-
tions involved to strengthen unifying factors and to overcome divisive influ-
ences in reintegration. However, it remains to be seen whether demobilisa-
tion and reintegration can support long-term peace and development, espe-
cially since – no matter how important – the situation of the ex-combatants is 
not the only influencing factor in the peace process. 
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